Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 78
Issue 3 Symposium: The Jury at a Crossroad:
The American Experience

Article 17

October 2003

Technology Service Solutions: New Wine in Old Wineskins?
Elizabeth A. Pawlicki

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth A. Pawlicki, Technology Service Solutions: New Wine in Old Wineskins?, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1379 (2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol78/iss3/17

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

TECHNOLOGY SERVICE SOLUTIONS: NEW WINE IN OLD
WINESKINS?
ELIZABETH A. PAWLICKI, O.P.*

INTRODUCTION

People do not put new wine into old wineskins. Otherwise the
skins burst, the wine spills out, and the skins are ruined. Rather,
they pour new wine into fresh wineskins, and both are preserved.'

By endorsing the application of traditional union access rules to
the nontraditional telework environment of the twenty-first century,
the National Labor Relations Board effectively denies an emerging
segment of U.S. workers a right that has long been a cornerstone of
national labor policy-the right to organize and join a union.2 Technology Service Solutions ("TSS"), a national computer system
installation and repair company, employs 236 customer service
3
representatives ("CSRs") in its eight-state south-central region.
CSRs install, service, and repair computers at geographically dispersed TSS customer locations. 4 They typically work alone and rarely
report to any centralized TSS or customer location.5 Rather, CSRs
routinely receive work assignments and communicate with their

* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2002; B.S.F., West
Virginia University, 1980. The author wishes to thank Professor Martin H. Malin, Pamela M.
Quigley, Laurie Brink, O.P., Irving M. Friedman, Stanley Eisenstein, Victoria L. Bor, S. Richard
Pincus, and the Sinsinawa Dominicans for their insights, assistance, support, and encouragement.
1. Matt. 9:17 (New American Bible).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (declaring that U.S. labor policy will encourage the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining via "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection").
3. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 2 (2000). The south-central
region includes the states of Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas,
and parts of Nebraska and Wyoming.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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supervisors through a computerized7 wireless dispatch system. 6 CSRs
have little contact with one another.
In an attempt to organize CSRs in the eight-state region, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW" or "the

Union"), on behalf of an interested TSS employee, asked TSS to
provide the names and addresses of all CSRs in the region.8 The
Union issued this request early in its organizing campaign, before it
established the 30% initial showing of interest required to trigger a
certification election.9 TSS denied the Union's request, and the
Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor

Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") alleging an 8(a)(1)
violation. 10
In resolving this issue, the Board applied the Supreme Court's
"reasonable alternative means" ("RAM") test 1 and held that TSS did
not commit an unfair labor practice when it refused to provide the
union with the CSRs' names and addresses.12 Specific realities of the
1950s workplace prompted the Supreme Court's 1956 articulation of
the RAM test. 3 The Court affirmed the test's application to the
traditional fixed plant work environment in 1992.14

6. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. 298, 298 (1997).
7. Id.
8. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100 slip op. at 2; see also Excelsior Underwear,
Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966) (establishing the "Excelsior list" requirement for NLRB
representation election cases). Within seven days after the NLRB regional director approves a
consent election agreement, or after the regional director or the Board directs a certification
election, the employer must submit a list containing the names and addresses of all eligible
voters in the bargaining unit to the regional director. The regional director makes the list
available to all parties to the organizing campaign.
9. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (2003) (requiring a 30% showing of bargaining unit interest before a
certification election may be scheduled by the NLRB).
10. See Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 1. The Union alleged a
violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Under this section, it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights under section 7 of the Act. Section 7 rights include the right to selforganization; to form, join, or assist labor organizations; to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing; and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
11. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
12. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 7.
13. See Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113-14. The workplaces in this case were large manufacturing
plants close to small, well-settled communities. A large percentage of the plants' employees
lived in the community surrounding the plant.
14. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539-41 (1992). The workplace in this case
was a single retail store located in a shopping plaza. All store employees lived in the same
metropolitan area where the store was located.
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This Comment argues that, in applying the Court's RAM test to
the modern teleworkplace, the Board placed new wine in old wineskins. A new test is needed if, consistent with U.S. labor policy, the
15
right of teleworkers to organize and join a union is to be preserved.
A 2001 research survey indicates that there were approximately 28
million teleworkers in the United States that year. 16 Therefore, a
timely re-evaluation of Board's position is warranted. Part I of this
Comment reviews the common and administrative law background
necessary to analyze the Board's opinion. Part II outlines the facts,
arguments, and issues raised by the TSS case. Part III evaluates the
shortcomings of the Babcock & Wilcox/Lechmere RAM test in the
modern teleworkplace. Part IV suggests a scheme for determining
when employers should be required to provide the names and home
addresses of workers to employees or nonemployee union organizers
seeking to organize the teleworkplace.
EVOLUTION OF WORKPLACE RIGHTS

I.

A.

The National Labor Relations Act

With the passage of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (the
"NLRA" or the "Act"), and its progeny and amendments, 7 employee's efforts to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing gained legal protection. 8 Section 7 of
the Act contains the following list of protections:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-

15.

See

INT'L

TELEWORK

ASS'N

&

COUNCIL,

ITAC

ADVANCING WORK

FROM

ANYWHERE (defining telework as the use of computers and telecommunications, from any
remote location, to satisfy client needs), at http://www.workingfromanywhere.org/pdf/ITACbrochure.pdf.
16. See DONALD D. DAVIS &

KAREN A.

POLONKO, TELEWORK AMERICA 2001

SUMMARY (2001), at http://www.workingfromanywhere.org/telework/twa2001.htm.
17. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531;
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97; National Labor Relations Act
of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
18. Id. § 151.
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tion as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3).19

Section 8 of the Act identifies behaviors that constitute unfair labor practices that violate employees' section 7 rights.2° Section 3
authorizes the creation of a five-person NLRB and charges it to
make, amend, and rescind the rules and regulations necessary to
implement the Act and guard the rights of both employees and
21
employers.
The Act's preamble offers two justifications, each based on
workplace experience, for enacting the legislation.22 Specifically,
through the Act, Congress recognizes that protecting workers' rights
promotes behaviors that help to maintain industrial peace and
23
safeguard the uninterrupted flow of commerce.
Twenty years after Congress passed the NLRA, the Supreme
Court recognized that workers would be unable to fully realize their
section 7 rights unless they had the opportunity to exercise an informed choice regarding the advantages and disadvantages of selforganization. 24 Guided by this judicial pronouncement, the NLRB
employs its adjudication procedures to establish rules granting
workers access to the information and dialogue they need to make
such a choice35 Through its appellate function, the Court refines the
26
Board's rules.
19. Id. § 157.
20. Id. § 158.
21. Id. § 153.
22. Id. § 151. In the Act's preamble, Congress explained that
[workplace] experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours,
or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
Id.
23. Id.
24. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (holding that "the right
of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability to employees to learn the
advantages of self-organization from others").
25. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974) (granting the Board
discretion to announce new principles through either adjudication or rulemaking).
26. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537-41 (1992) (rejecting the Board's
balancing test that weighed employees' right to self-organization against employers' property
right to exclude nonemployee union organizers from company property, and evaluating the
availability of reasonably effective alternative means of communication between employees and
the organizing union). The Court held that the NLRA did not compel employers to allow
distribution of union literature by nonemployee union organizers on employers' property unless
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In each of the key union access cases, the Court made deliberate
mention of employee's organizational rights under the Act and
employer's property rights under the common law.17 In addition, the
Court recognized the unique workplace geography that framed the
relationship between particular employees, employers, and labor
28
organizations .
Many contemporary expressions of the American workplace
have no mid- to late-twentieth-century counterpart. 29 The American
work scene is no longer predominantly comprised of large, highly
centralized, fixed industrial worksites employing stable rosters of
regular shift workers recruited from local neighborhoods 30 Rather,
improvements in technology and transportation prompt many contemporary businesses to operate in decentralized electronic work
environments staffed by geographically dispersed teleworkers. 31 Such
32
is the workplace for TSS' customer service representatives.
the location of the plant and the living quarters of the employees placed employees beyond the
reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with employees through usual channels.
27. See id. at 537; Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112; Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793, 798 (1945).
28. See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540; Babcock, 351 U.S. at 106-07, 111; Republic Aviation, 324
U.S. at 797.
29. See INT'L TELEWORK ASS'N & COUNCIL, TELECOMMUTING (OR TELEWORK): ALIVE
AND WELL OR FADING AWAY? (2000), at http://www.telecommute.org/aboutitac/alive.shtm
(copy on file with author) ("Advances in information technology and telecommunications now
enable work independent of location. The concept of a single assigned place to work is, for
many workers, obsolete. It is costly, ineffective, and no longer matches the needs and desires of
today's workforce.").
30. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS RELEASES 2000-2010 EMPLOYMENT
PROJECTIONS (2001) (citing ten-year projections of employment by industry and occupation),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.nr0.htm. Service-producing industries will
continue to be the dominant employment generator, adding 20.5 million jobs by 2010. "As
employment in the service-producing sector increases by 19 percent, manufacturing employment is expected to increase by only 3 percent over the 2000-10 period." Id.
31. See INT'L TELEWORK ASS'N & COUNCIL, supra note 29:
Infonetics Research forecasts a 529% increase in VPN (Virtual Private Networks-the
technology that enables remote working) expenditures from 2000 through 2004. IDC
projects that by 2004, mobile professionals will make up 34% of the US mobile &
remote population, followed by work extenders (31%), telecommuters (21%), and
mobile data collectors (14%). In sum, the numbers of teleworkers are growing, as are
the enabling technologies that allow more people to do "office work" away from the
office.
See also U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TELEWORK WORKS: A COMPENDIUM OF
SUCCESS STORIES (2001), available at http://www.opm.gov/studies/FINAL-TELEWRK.htm.
The U.S. Office of Personnel Management recognizes that "the advent of smaller-faster-better
computers, the Internet, and email have made it possible for employees to seamlessly work
away from the traditional office setting. Environmental concerns about pollution, fuel costs,
and crowded roads have also contributed to the need to find creative approaches to accomplishing work outside of the traditional office setting." Id.
32. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 2 (2000).
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The Recognition of Competing Rights

B.

Congress enacted the NLRA to reduce industrial strife and promote the free flow of commerce. 33 To achieve this goal within the
context of a capitalist system, Congress had to recognize and accommodate the interests of both employers and employees.3 4 "Capitalism's basic assumptions concerning private ownership of property
became an implicit part of the statute. As a result, several rights of

employers, although not expressly provided for in the Act, have been
read as essential ingredients in the statutory scheme."3 5 Employer's

property and control rights fall into this category of essential consid36
erations .
To complete the industrial peace equation, Congress explicitly
recognized and guaranteed workers the right to organize and bargain
collectively with their employers. 37 In passing the Act, Congress

expressed its preference for a workplace relationship governed by the
parties' unique collectively bargained private agreement over any
generic understanding of workplace relationship defined by govern38

ment regulation.
The tension between employer's property rights and employee's

organizational rights is repeatedly illustrated in cases concerning
nonemployee union organizer access to employees on employer
property.39 In Republic Aviation v. NLRB, one of the earliest union

access cases, the Supreme Court wrote: "[union access cases] bring
here for review the action of the National Labor Relations Board in
working out an adjustment between the undisputed right of self33. Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizingin Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
34. Malin & Perritt, supra note 33, at 5-6.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 6-7; see also Michael L. Stevens, The Conflict Between Union Access and Private
Property Rights: Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY L.J.
1317, 1318 (1992).
37. Malin & Perritt, supra note, 33 at 5; see also 29 U.S.C. § 151:
[Pirotection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow
of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
38. Malin & Perritt, supra note 33, at 5.
39. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527,529-41 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 106-14 (1956); see also Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988); Fairmont Hotel
Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 139 (1988); Dexter Thread Mills, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972).
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organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act and the

equally undisputed rights of employers to maintain discipline in their
establishments. ' 40 The Court reiterated this belief in a later key case,
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.: "Organization rights are granted to

workers by the same authority, the National Government, that
preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be

of one as is consistent with the
obtained with as little destruction
4
maintenance of the other." '
C.
1.

Union Access to Employer Property
During the Organizational Campaign

In spite of the tension between the competing rights discussed
above, the Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right of selforganization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to
learn the advantages of self-organization from others. '42 Thus, the
Board and the courts have struggled to articulate equitable rules

governing nonemployee union organizers' access to employer's
property for the purpose of communicating the advantages of self-

organization from the union's perspective.
In formulating union access rules, decision makers have been
careful to consider the status of those seeking access and to map the
particular workplace geography at issue. In Republic Aviation, the
Court endorsed the Board's policy of allowing employees to distribute and discuss union information on company property during

nonwork time. 43 However, the Court's earliest union access ruling

40. Republic Aviation Corp. V.NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945).
41. 351 U.S. at 112.
42. Id. at 113.
43. See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 802-03; see also Peyton Packing Co., 49
N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943):
The [National Labor Relations] Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from
making and enforcing reasonable [work] rules covering the conduct of employees on
company time. Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province of an
employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid in the absence of evidence that is
was adopted for a discriminatory purpose. It is no less true that time outside working
hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on company property. It is therefore not within the province of an employer
to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside
of working hours, although on company property. Such a rule must be presumed to be
an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory in the
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contains more than a rule endorsement. 44 While the Court considered
the companies' manufacturing plant layouts and proximity to public
property, 5 the Court grounded its ultimate holding on the Board's
appraisal of the behaviors constituting "normal conditions" in industrial establishments.16 Under normal industrial conditions, employees
possess a right to enter the employer's property; thus, the Court
found it unreasonable for employers to regulate employee conduct on
47
company property during nonwork time.
The Court examined nonemployee union organizer access to
employer's property eleven years later in Babcock.48 The change in
status of the persons seeking access to the employer's property led
the Court to modify the Republic Aviation rule.49 The Babcock Court
held that employers could validly post their property against nonemployee solicitation and distribution of union materials when "reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of
communication enable it to reach the employees with its message"
and the anti-solicitation policy is not discriminatorily applied to the
union alone.5 0 The Court went on to recognize that, when organizational rights conflict with property rights, the Board must accommodate them "with as little destruction of one [right] as is consistent with
the maintenance of the other."51 Finally, the Court provided the
Board with a guiding principle: "when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to
communicate with [employees] through the usual channels, the right
to exclude from property has been required to yield to the extent
needed to permit communication of information on the right to
organize. "'52
Reasonableness may be assessed by examining the location of a
plant in relation to the location of the living quarters of the employees. 3 In Babcock, union access to the employer's property was
absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to
maintain production or discipline."
44. Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 802-03.
45. Id. at 795-800
46. Id. at 804.
47. Id. at 805.
48. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
49. Id. at 110-11, 113.
50. Id. at 112.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 113.
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denied because an analysis of the location factors did not place the
employees beyond reasonable union efforts to communicate with
them; usual methods of imparting information were available and
deemed sufficient.54 The Court repeatedly affirmed this RAM test,
rejecting the Board's short-lived 1988 Jean Country "rights-oriented
'55
balancing test.
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, a 1992 Supreme Court case, constitutes
the Court's most recent endorsement of the Babcock
RAM/inaccessibility exception test.5 6 The Court reiterated Babcock's
teaching, which it characterized as "straightforward":
Section 7 [of the NLRA] simply does not protect nonemployee union organizers except in the rare case where "the inaccessibility of
employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels."
Our reference to "reasonable" attempts was nothing more than a
commonsense recognition that unions need not engage in extraordinary feats to communicate with inaccessible employees-not an
endorsement of the view (which we expressly rejected) that the Act
protects "reasonable" trespasses. Where reasonable alternative
means of access exist, Section 7's guarantees do not authorize trespass by nonemployee organizers, even (as we noted in Babcock...)
"under... reasonable regulations" established by the Board.57
Several Board cases illustrate the application of Lechmere's alternative means test. 58 In Husky Oil NPR Operations, the Board
granted union organizers access to an employer's property because
the Board found it impossible for union organizers to reach employees through the usual means of communication; 9 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. 60 While the NLRB's
Husky Oil decision predates Lechmere by ten years, the 1998 Board
and 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found Husky Oil of continuing precedential value because it was premised on a Babcock/Lechmere, rather than a Jean Country, analysis.6
54. Id. at 113-14.
55. See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988) (establishing a test whereby the Board
would assess an employer's right to exclude nonemployee union organizers as trespassers via
the analysis of three factors: the strength of the owners property rights, the strength of the
union's section 7 rights, and the availability of reasonable alternative means of communication).
56. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527,538 (1992).
57. Id. at 537.
58. See Nabors Ala. Drilling, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 574 (1998), enforced by 190 F.3d 1008 (9th
Cir. 1999); Oakland Mall, Ltd., 316 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1995); Husky Oil NPR Operations, 245
N.L.R.B. 353 (1979), enforced by 669 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1982).
59. Husky Oil, 245 N.L.R.B. at 356.
60. Husky Oil, 669 F.2d at 648.
61. Nabors, 325 N.L.R.B. at 44.
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Husky Oil's forty-five employees worked in a remote area on the
North Slope of Alaska, approximately 660 miles north of Anchorage. 62 Employees worked twelve-hour shifts, seven days per week,
over a four consecutive month period. 63 Transportation in and out of
the work camp was exclusively by airplane. 64 Apart from the employer's premises, union access to Husky Oil's employees was limited
to interactions at the Anchorage airport when employees were
returning home at the conclusion of a four-month shift, or meetings at
65
the employee's homes.
The Board found problems with every employer-proposed alternative and indicated that none of the fiscally feasible options were
likely to reach all of the employees in the proposed bargaining unit.66
Thus, finding effective and reasonable alternative means of communication lacking, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Board's order granting
union access to the employer's property. 67 Finally, the court noted
that the Babcock standard did not require a union to undertake
predictably futile methods of communication before such methods
may be deemed unreasonable; rather, "[decision makers] may assess
the channels available to the union without first requiring the union
to try them." 68
69
The Nabors Alaska Drillingcase presents a similar fact pattern.
An AFL-CIO affiliate sought to organize approximately 290 Nabors
employees working on four arctic drilling rigs in several remote areas
of Alaska.70 Initially, the union conducted informational meetings for
Nabors employees at the Anchorage Airport. 7t These gatherings
helped the union garner enough signed authorization cards to petition
72
for an NLRB certification election.
In its attempt to communicate with Nabors' employees, the union mailed prounion information to employees' homes, distributed
leaflets at the airport, and directed prounion employees to discuss
union benefits with their coworkers; because the cost was prohibitive,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Husky Oil, 669 F.2d at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Nabors Ala. Drilling, Inc., 190 F.3d. 1008, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
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the union did not advertise its cause in newspapers or on television. 73
Nonetheless, upholding the Board's factual finding, the court granted
union organizers access to Nabors' property because the union did
not otherwise possess reasonably effective means of communicating
74
with Nabors' employees.
2.

Upon the Direction of a Board-Sponsored Election

An assessment of the workplace of the mid-1960s persuaded the
Board to announce a rule requiring "higher standards of disclosure
than [they had] heretofore imposed."75 This rule, now known as the
Excelsior rule, requires an employer to file an election eligibility list
containing the names and addresses of all eligible voters in the
bargaining unit with the NLRB regional director once the regional
director has approved a consent election agreement or has directed a
representation election. 6 The Board offered two central justifications
for the imposition of this new rule.77 First, the Board desired to
increase the likelihood that employees would cast informed ballots
when voting for or against union representation.7 8 Thus, the Board
believed it appropriate to promote communication methods that
facilitate "free and reasoned choice." 9 Second, the Board desired to
acknowledge a twofold workplace reality: (a) employee names and
addresses are not readily available from any source other than the
employer,80 and (b) while employers are entitled to control the
property they own, employers lack a significant interest in the secrecy
of employee names and addresses. 81 In crafting this rule, the Board
explicitly acknowledged specific workplace realities:
[11n a large plant or store, where many employees are unknown to
their fellows, [union-supporting employees may be unable to secure] the names and addresses of a major proportion of the total
73. Id. at 1011.
74. Id. at 1014.
75. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239 (1966).
76. Id. at 1239-40. Note the distinction between an Excelsior list (i.e., a list containing the
names and home addresses of all eligible voters in a bargaining unit that is provided by an
employer to the NLRB regional director upon the direction of a NLRB-sponsored representation election) and an Excelsior-type list (i.e., a list containing the names and home addresses of
all eligible voters in a bargaining unit provided during the organizing phase, prior to the
direction of an election).
77. Id. at 1240-42.
78. Id. at 1240.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1241.
81. Id. at 1243, 1245.
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employee complement.... Furthermore, employees are frequently
known to their fellows only by first names or nicknames, so that
there may be significant problems in obtaining the home addresses
even of those employees whose names are known. Finally, all the
foregoing difficulties are compounded by the more or less constant
turnover in the employee complement of any employer. 82

II. TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SOLUTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS

A.

Structure and Organizationof TSS

Technology Service Solutions provides computer repair and
maintenance services to its clients throughout the United States.83
The business operates through regions which are further subdivided
into territories. 84 Colorado, New Mexico, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and portions of Wyoming and Nebraska comprise
TSS's south-central region ( the "region").85 The State of Colorado
consists of two territories, E and X.86
TSS employs customer service representatives to install, service,
and repair computers at geographically dispersed TSS customer
locations. 87 CSRs typically work alone and rarely report to any
centralized TSS or customer location.88 In fact, they routinely receive
work assignments and communicate with their supervisors solely
through TSS's computerized wireless communication system. 9 TSS
provides each CSR with a hand-held portable terminal known as a
"brick" and CSRs use the brick to receive assignments and communicate with the Regional office. 90 Finally, CSRs have little contact with
one another and neither wear a uniform nor drive a vehicle identifying them as TSS employees. 91

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1241.
Tech. Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. 298, 298 (1997).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 299.
Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 2 (2000).
Id.
Tech. Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. at 298.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 299.
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B.

The Union's OrganizingEfforts

After receiving a pay cut in October 1994, Dennis Phillips, a
Colorado-based CSR, contacted the IBEW about the possibility of
organizing Colorado CSRs. 92 To conduct a preliminary assessment of
CSR interest, IBEW organizer Rosemary Sheridan asked Phillips for
the names and addresses of his coworkers. 93 As Phillips did not
possess a TSS employee directory, he compiled his own by utilizing
specific codes on his TSS-issued brick. 94 Employing this method,
Phillips eventually provided Sheridan with the names of approximately thirty CSRs. 95
The IBEW filed its first representation petition in April 1995.96
The petition was withdrawn when the Union learned it incorrectly
calculated the required showing of interest. 97 The Union secured
additional authorization cards and filed a second petition approxi98
mately three weeks later.
TSS opposed the petition. 99 Following a hearing, the regional director designated territory E and territory X as distinct appropriate
bargaining units; TSS subsequently provided the requisite Excelsior
list for these two units. 1°° Upon appeal by TSS, the Board overruled
the regional director's decision and designated TSS's entire southcentral region as the only appropriate bargaining unit. 10 1 The Board
based its July 20 decision on:
the great extent to which control of [TSS's] operations, including
labor relations and personnel matters, is centralized in the Employer's SC Regional Office and the absence of any tenable basis
for finding subsets of the SC Region's CSRs that have a greater

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. By entering specific "location codes" on his brick, Phillips could obtain the last
names and code numbers of fellow CSRs in Colorado.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. At the time of the initial filing, neither the Union nor the Colorado CSR working
with the Union knew for certain the number of CSRs working in Colorado territories E and X.
Based on preliminary organizing efforts, they believed the number was thirty-eight. They were
wrong. The actual number was seventy-eight. See Charging Party's Brief at 7-8, Tech. Serv.
Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. 298 (Nos. 27-CA-13971 & 27-CA-13971-3); Answering Brief of
Respondent Technology Service Solutions at 7, Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100
(Nos. 27-CA-13971 & 27-CA-13971-3).
98. Tech Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. at 299.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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community of interest among themselves than the SC Region's
CSRs as a whole. 102
On July 25, the Union asked TSS to supply it with an Excelsiortype list for all 236 CSRs in the south-central region. 103 The Union
asserted that TSS's highly centralized organization and use of a
wireless communication system denied CSRs interested in union
organizing access to other CSRs in the Region; this lack of access
allegedly constituted a violation of the NLRA as it interfered with
and restrained CSRs from exercising their section 7 rights. 1°4 When
TSS denied the Union's request, the Union filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB. 05 The regional director issued a
complaint alleging that TSS's denial of the Excelsior-type list violated
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because "there was no reasonable
alternative means for the Union to communicate with the [southcentral region] employees."' 6 The complaint also alleged that TSS
violated section 8(a)(1) when it threatened to discipline an employee
if he contacted other employees regarding unionization. 01 7
In September 1996, Administrative Law Judge ("AL") James
M. Kennedy issued an order granting TSS's motion to dismiss the
complaint.1°8 In August 1997, in response to appeals filed by the
Union and NLRB general counsel, the Board reversed, holding that
the ALJ's dismissal was "improvidently granted." 109 In addition, the
Board rejected that portion of the ALJ's holding that equated an
unfair labor practice with the commission of an overt affirmative act

102. Tech. Serv. Solutions, No. 27-RC-7557, 1995 WL 681435 at *2 (N.L.R.B. July 20, 1995);
see also ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 275-76 (12th ed. 1996). In making bargaining
unit determinations, the Board attempts to identify an employee group united by a "community
of interest." In making such judgments, the Board considers factors such as:
(1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (3)
similarity in the kind of work performed; (4) similarity in the qualifications, skills and
training of the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange among the employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production processes; (8)
common supervision and determination of labor-relations policy; (9) history of collective bargaining; (10) desires of the affected employees; and (11) extent of union organization.
Id.
103. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. at 299-300.
104. Id.
105. Tech. Serv. Solutions, No. 27-CA-13971, 27-CA-13971-3, JD(SF)-59-96, 1996 WL
33321648 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 20, 1996).
106. Id. (ALJ quoting complaint allegation).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. at 302.
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by an employer.1o° The Board remanded the case, which raised issues
of first impression, for a full hearing and directed the ALJ to more
fully evaluate the issues of CSR accessibility and the practicability of
union organization under TSS's regional structure. M11
ALJ Kennedy completed the hearing and issued a final decision
dismissing the complaint in its entirety in February 1999.112 Employing Lechmere's RAM analysis, the ALJ concluded that, because
CSRs in TSS's south-central region were not inaccessible to union
organizers, TSS did not commit an unfair labor practice when it
refused to provide an Excelsior-type list for the region."3 In coming
to this conclusion, the ALJ evaluated the Union's efforts to contact
14
CSRs employed throughout the region and found them deficient.
The Union and general counsel appealed ALJ Kennedy's decision." 5 In October 2000, without adopting all of the AL's findings or
reasoning, a two-member majority (Chairman Truesdale and Member
Hurtgen, Member Fox dissenting) affirmed the judge's dismissal of
the unfair labor practice charge regarding access to the Excelsior-type
list.116 The majority endorsed and utilized Lechmere's reasonable
alternative means test in resolving the case." 7
[W]e find application of Lechmere's "no reasonable alternative
means" standard to be appropriate here. Indeed, application of a
lesser standard, under which the Respondent [TSS] would be required to supply a list of its employees' names and addresses to the
Union even when it is not shown that the Union lacks a reasonable
means to communicate with the employees, would tend to undermine the careful balance drawn by the Board's Excelsior decision,
which,... requires employers to provide8 such a list only after an
election has been directed or agreed to."
The panel, however, held that TSS violated section 8(a)(1) when
its customer service manager "cautioned" an employee about sending
messages to other employees concerning union organizing efforts." 9
The Board ordered TSS to post a notice at its regionalheadquartersin
110. Id. at 300-02.
111. Id. at 302.
112. Tech. Serv. Solutions, No. 27-CA-13971, 27-CA-13971-3, 1999 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 47, at
*59 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 2, 1999).
113. Id.
114. Id. at*28-*33.
115. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 1 (2000).
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id. at 4.
118. Id. at 5.
119. Id. at 1.
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Colorado that informed all employees of the violation and assured all
employees that it would refrain from such conduct in the future. 12 0
Following this decision, the Union and the general counsel filed
motions for reconsideration, arguing that the Board's Order requiring
TSS to post the notice of violation solely at its Colorado regional
headquarters would fail to accomplish its purpose -communicating
2
the Board's decision to all TSS CSRs in the south-central region.1 1
The Board found these motions meritorious and modified the posting
requirement as follows:
We... find that it would best effectuate the policies of the Act...
to require [the employer, TSS] to mail the notice to all CSRs in the
south-central region and to post the notice at all its parts locations
in the south-central region. Requiring posting at the parts locations
alone might not be adequate to assure that all CSRs are informed
about the outcome of this case, as it is not clear from the record
that all CSRs visit [TSS's] parts locations. 122
III. UNION ACCESS IN THE TELEWORKPLACE: THE LECHMERE
STANDARD DENIES TELEWORKERS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.
A.

Lechmere StandardInappropriate

The Board's reliance on Lechmere's RAM analysis is misplaced
for three reasons. First, this case presents no question of access to
TSS's property by nonemployees; issues of trespass and the property
rights of an employer are not involved. Second, the rights asserted
are directly those of TSS's employees, not outsider nonemployees.
Third, and most important, only the limited privacy interest of TSS
employees in their names and addresses is affected and this interest is
hardly for the employer to safeguard.
The Lechmere test analyzes and attempts to balance employer's
property rights against employee's section 7 rights. 12 3 When a case
fails to implicate both interests, however, Lechmere should not apply.
In its July 25 letter to TSS, the Union requested both an Excelsiortype list for all CSRs in the region and access to TSS's electronic

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 8.
See Tech. Serv. Solutions, 334 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 1-2 (2001).
Id. at 3.
See Malin & Perritt, supra note 33, at 7.
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communication system.124 Only the equipment access request implicated a TSS property interest. But the Union did not include the
denial of access to the electronic communication system in its unfair
labor practice charge; only the Excelsior-type list request was included. 1z Thus, the case fails to implicate a significant employer
property interest to be balanced.
To overcome TSS's lack of a property interest, the Board cites
26
another significant employer right: the employee's right to privacy.1
To be sure, in this [TSS] case, unlike Lechmere, the Union does not
seek to enter on the Respondent's land and thus the Respondent's
rights in its real property are not at issue. Nevertheless, the Union's request for the names and addresses of the Respondent's employees12implicates
another significant right, the employees' right to
7
privacy.

However, in recognizing CSR privacy as a substantial TSS employer
interest, the majority ignores the fact that it rejected that very privacy
right as an impediment to requiring employers to furnish a union with
employee's names and addresses:
A list of employee names and addresses is not like a customer list,
and an employer would appear to have no significant interest in
keeping the names and addresses of his employees secret (other
than a desire to prevent the union from communicating with employees-an interest we see no reason to protect). Such legitimate
interest in secrecy as an employer may have is, in any event, plainly
outweighed by the substantial public interest in favor of disclosure
where, as here disclosure is a key factor in ensuring a fair and free
electorate.12
In her dissent, Board Member Sarah M. Fox, citing Excelsior,
criticized the majority for acting on the assumption that TSS was
"entitled to champion the interest of its employees in maintaining the
privacy of their names and addresses.

' 129

Member Fox recalled that,

in Excelsior, the Board held that any privacy interest of employers or
employees was "not considered of sufficient magnitude to require the
Board to consider 'the existence of alternative channels of communication before requiring disclosure of information.' ' 30 A careful
124. Charging Party's Brief at 26, Tech. Serv. Solutions (No. 27-CA-13971 & 27-CA-139713).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 3-4 (2000).
Id.
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1243 (1966).
Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 11.
Id.
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reading of the Board's Excelsior opinion reveals that the Board did
not fully legitimate the concept of an employer interest in nondiscloRather, the Board merely allowed for this possibility to
sure.'
to ememphasize that any privacy interest must be subordinated
32
ployee's demonstrated interest in self-organization.
The nature of the TSS teleworkplace and the enormity of the
Board's ultimate bargaining unit designation prevent TSS's CSRs
from promoting the possibility of unionization in the traditional way;
face-to-face interpersonal dialogue between coworkers was not an
option across an eight-state bargaining unit. This constellation of
factors distinguishes the present case from all its predecessors.
In the language of Lechmere, TSS employees are "isolated from
the ordinary flow of information that characterizes" the traditional
workplace. 33 Nonetheless, working together, the Union and a
handful of CSRs were able to satisfy the 30% showing of interest
34
requirement for their desired statewide (Colorado) bargaining unit.
Even then, the effectiveness of a bargaining unit limited to a single
state was attributable to a lone CSR's unauthorized use of the brickemployer property-to interact with other in-state CSRs.
Once the Board determined that the appropriate bargaining unit
was TSS's eight-state region, the Board imposed a huge burden on
the employee's efforts to organize. The employer had already
furnished the Union with an Excelsior list for the one-state bargaining
unit. Certainly the employees in the eight-state unit had the same
privacy right in their names and addresses as those employees in the
single-state unit. And the employees seeking to organize had the
same right to this limited information in the larger unit that, after all,
was the unit that TSS had successfully appealed to the board. The
Board's unwillingness to recognize the CSR's inability to communicate with one another within their unique electronic workplace,
coupled with the Board's certification of an eight-state bargaining
unit and the employer's refusal to provide a means for employees to
communicate within that unit, effectively halted employee attempts to
exercise their section 7 rights to organize.

131. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1245.
132. Id. Excelsior and its progeny clearly required demonstrated employee interest in selforganization as a precondition to disclosure.
133. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992).
134. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 2.
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Clearly, the Act and NLRB case law prohibit an employer from
assisting employees in their organizational efforts. 3 However, where
the workplace itself presents unique obstacles to the ability of employees to exercise their rights under the Act, there must be reasonable accommodation between employee's section 7 rights and the
realities posed by the workplace.
Consider the reality of the TSS worksite. CSRs are largely isolated from one another and are not readily identifiable as TSS employees. 13 6 CSRs, as a group, have no common worksite at either the
state or regional level.137 There is no physical plant or other physical
location to which they commonly report; no cafeteria, parking lot, or
lounge at which they gather; no bulletin boards where they may post
notices for one another to see. 13 8 Most CSRs work alone and out of
their homes and drive unmarked cars. 39 For CSRs, the TSS worksite
is their employer's computerized dispatch and communication
system.' 0
Given the concern over protecting employer's property rights, it
is curious that the Board and Judge Kennedy faulted the CSRs and
the Union for failing to fully utilize communication methods that had
been effective in establishing the required showing of interest for the
Colorado bargaining unit.' 4' The Board and the ALJ trace the success
of the Union's Colorado campaign to Phillips' unauthorizeduse of his
employer's property-the brick. 142 Unauthorized use of employersupplied equipment constitutes a clear infringement on an employer's
property right. As employers possess no property right to the names
and addresses of their employees, their disclosure of such information
in a telework environment advances national labor policy; it does not
violate employer's legitimate property rights. The Lechmere/Babcock
RAM test should not be extended to the teleworkplace; rather, to
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to such efforts); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105, 112 (1956) (holding that the union may not always insist that the employer aid the
organization).
136. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. 298, 299 (1999).
137. Id. at 298.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 3 (2000); Tech. Serv. Solutions,
No. 27-CA-13971, 1999 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 47, at *30-*33 (N.L.R.B. 1999).
142. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100 at 3; Tech. Serv. Solutions, 1999 N.L.R.B.
LEXIS 47, at *31-*33.
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effectuate national labor policy in the new millennium, it must be
limited to traditional fixed-plant work environments.
B. Lechmere Misapplied
The Babcock-Lechmere standard grants nonemployee union organizers access to an employer's property only in the rare case where
"'the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable
attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the
usual channels.' '1 43 In crafting this rule, the Court defined "reasonable" attempts as those that do not require unions to engage in
14
extraordinary feats to communicate with inaccessible employees.
The Court went on to justify the inaccessibility exception as necessary
"to protect the § 7 rights of those employees who, by virtue of their
employment, are isolated from the ordinary flow of information that
145
characterizesour society.'
In the dynamic and evolving teleworkplace, where significant
geographic distances often separate employees over vast multistate
areas, what activities comprise "reasonable" attempts to communicate? Where face-to-face interpersonal contact between employees is
rare, what communication channels are "usual?" With the advent of
extraordinary technologies that allow employees to work away from a
fixed site, what is the ordinary flow of information that characterizes
society? Where employer property subject to nonemployee trespass
does not exist, what employer right trumps employees' long recognized right to organize and join a union? The Board's majority ruling
failed to fully address these issues in resolving Technology Services
Solutions. As a result, the Board's allegedly straightforward application of the Babcock-Lechmere rule to the TSS teleworkplace appears
misdirected. However, assuming arguendo that the majority justifiably extended Lechmere's reasonable alternative means test to TSS's
telework environment, it misapplied the test.
The Board majority adopted the ALl's finding that TSS did not
violate the Act when it refused to provide the Union with a list of
CSRs' names and addresses because the Board's general counsel
failed to prove that, without the list, the Union had no reasonable

143. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
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means of communicating with bargaining unit employees throughout
the eight-state south-central region.146 The majority recognized and
lauded the Union's success in obtaining a showing of interest in its
desired single-state bargaining unit and faulted the Union for failing
to employ similar organizing techniques in the expanded unit.1 47 The
majority, however, ignored the fact that Union's success in Colorado
was directly attributable to an employee's unauthorized use of
148
employer property-his brick-to contact other Colorado CSRs!
In placing its imprimatur on such trespass, the Board endorsed the
unauthorized use of employer property and essentially reclassified
formerly impermissible conduct as reasonable. Thus, the Board did
not apply the Lechmere standard. Rather, it redefined the test by
expanding the sphere of what constitutes reasonable conduct.
Additional support for the proposition that TSS's CSRs are "isolated from the ordinary flow of information that characterizes our
society" comes from the Board itself. In resolving the Technology
Service Solutions case, the Board made two major findings. First, the
Board held that TSS did not violate the Act by failing to provide the
Union with an Excelsior-type list.149 Second, the Board held that TSS
committed an unfair labor practice when one of its supervisors
"cautioned" an employee about sending prounion messages to other
employees. 150 In response to this violation, the Board ordered TSS to
post a notice of violation at its regional headquarters in Englewood,
Colorado. 5 1 Thereafter, the Union and general counsel filed motions
for reconsideration, contending that the Board's usual single site
posting requirement would-in this unusual case-fail to "effectuate
the board's objective of informing affected employees" because none
of the south-central region's CSRs reported to regional headquarters." 2 Recognizing the communication challenges posed by TSS's
organizational structure and telework environment, the Board

146. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 3.
147. Id. at 6
148. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. 298, 299 (1999).
149. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 7.
150. Tech. Serv. Solutions, 334 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 1 (2001). The Board held that
such conduct constituted a section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice. Under this section, it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
151. Tech. Serv.Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 100 at 7-8.
152. Tech. Serv.Solutions, 334 N.L.R.B. No. 18 at 1.
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granted the motions and required TSS to mail the notice to each CSR
15 3
in the region.
In the telework environment of TSS's CSRs, communication between CSRs was unusual and occasional. 15 4 Regional CSR gatherings
occurred only once a year. 5 5 CSRs did not physically report to the
company's regional headquarters. 5 6 Given these workplace realities,
CSRs clearly qualify as workers for whom the Babcock-Lechmere
inaccessibility exception was drafted: "employees who, by virtue of
their employment, are isolated from the ordinary flow of information
157
that characterizes our society.'
IV. NEW TEST FOR THE TELEWORKPLACE

With its decision in Technology Services Solutions, the NLRB
failed to act on its Supreme Court recognized "responsibility to adapt
the [National Labor Relations] Act to changing patterns of industrial
life."'15 8 Hopefully, as the number of employees working away from
the traditional office or industrial plant setting continues to increase, 5 9 the Board will take this charge seriously and-in doing sodevelop a new standard that permits teleworkers to exercise "free and
reasoned choice" in the exercise of their section 7 right. This Comment offers one such possibility:
WHEN any employee, group of employees, or labor organization
acting in the employees' behalf, produces any evidence of employee
interest in learning more about the benefits of self-governance
through union representation; and where the employees typically
work alone, rarely interact with each other, rarely gather together
at a physical worksite, and primarily interact with their employer
electronically; and employee names and addresses are not readily

available from any source other than the employer, OR
WHERE an employee, group of employees, or any individual or
labor organization acting in the employees' behalf, files a representation petition under Section 9(c)(1)(A) of the Act and satisfies the
thirty percent showing of interest requirement; and the NLRB designates a significantly larger bargaining unit in which the employees
have no central physical workplace location where members regu153. Id. at 2-3.
154. Tech Serv. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. 298, 298 (1999).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992).
158. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (recognizing
responsibility is entrusted to the National Labor Relations Board, not the courts).
159. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 31.

that this

2003]

TECHNOLOGY SERVICE SOLUTIONS

larly gather; and employee names and addresses are not readily
available from any source other than the employerTHEN, the employer is required to provide a list containing each
employee's full name, home address, home telephone and e-mail
address to the employee, group of employees, or labor organization
acting in the employees' behalf.
The NLRA itself provides precedent to justify the development
and implementation of special provisions for unique workplaces. The
Act's 1974 amendments, sections 8(d) and (g), articulate special
notification and mediation provisions surrounding contract negotiations and strikes in the health care industry. 16° If the rights of health
care workers may be modified in response to the interests and demands of their unique workplace, the right of employers to refrain
from assisting employees or unions in their organizing efforts may be
modified in response to the interests and demands of the teleworkplace.
CONCLUSION

Traditionally, work linked employees to a single physical location. Advances in information technology and telecommunications
currently permit work independent of location. Such advances will
continue, making telework a valuable workplace option for an
increasing number of employers and workers. Unless the Board
recognizes these developments and drafts policies appropriate to the
realities of this emerging nontraditional workplace, the Board will
deny an increasing number of workers their right to organize and join
a labor union. To preserve this right, the Board must fashion new
wineskins suitable for the wine of the new millennium.

160. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).

